Bayesian persuasion with costly messages
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Bayesian persuasion with costly messages
zbMATH Open document ID: 1461.91061
author: Yanyan Li
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2021-05-11T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 7347192
zbMATH Keywords: Bayesian persuasion
zbMATH Keywords: partial commitment
zbMATH Keywords: full communication
zbMATH Keywords: costly messages
zbMATH Keywords: information misrepresentation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2021.105212
OpenAlex ID: W3131999083
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2021.105212
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7347192