Maxmin implementation
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Maxmin implementation
zbMATH Open document ID: 1461.91084
author: Rui Tang
author: Mu Zhang
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2021-05-11T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B03
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06
zbMATH DE Number: 7347210
zbMATH Keywords: implementation
zbMATH Keywords: ambiguity aversion
zbMATH Keywords: cyclical monotonicity
zbMATH Keywords: randomized reports
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2021.105250
OpenAlex ID: W4250988803
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2021.105250
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7347210