Effect of the group size on the evolution of cooperation when an exit option is present
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Effect of the group size on the evolution of cooperation when an exit option is present
zbMATH Open document ID: 1465.91015
author: Shun Kurokawa
published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology
publication date: 2021-06-03T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
zbMATH DE Number: 7354798
zbMATH Keywords: cooperation
zbMATH Keywords: evolutionary game theory
zbMATH Keywords: \(n\)-player game
zbMATH Keywords: internal equilibria
zbMATH Keywords: common goods
zbMATH Keywords: public goods
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jtbi.2021.110678
OpenAlex ID: W3137350011
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JTBI.2021.110678
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7354798