A model of river pollution as a dynamic game with network externalities
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A model of river pollution as a dynamic game with network externalities
zbMATH Open document ID: 1487.91086
author: Artem A. Sedakov
author: Han Qiao
author: Shouyang Wang
published in: European Journal of Operational Research
publication date: 2021-06-04T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B76
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90B10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A23
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A25
zbMATH DE Number: 7355320
zbMATH Keywords: OR in environment and climate change
zbMATH Keywords: dynamic games
zbMATH Keywords: networks
zbMATH Keywords: water pollution
zbMATH Keywords: location
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.ejor.2020.08.053
OpenAlex ID: W3082504216
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DOI: 10.1016/J.EJOR.2020.08.053
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7355320