The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1466.91014
author: László Á. Kóczy
author: P. Jean-Jacques Herings
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2021-06-08T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 7356580
zbMATH Keywords: coalition structure core
zbMATH Keywords: sequential dominance
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2021.02.003
OpenAlex ID: W3026902186
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2021.02.003
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7356580