Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading
zbMATH Open document ID: 1466.91070
author: Vincent P. Crawford
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2021-06-08T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B03
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A27
zbMATH DE Number: 7356581
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: bilateral trading
zbMATH Keywords: level-\(k\) thinking
zbMATH Keywords: behavioral game theory
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2021.02.005
OpenAlex ID: W2551355021
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2021.02.005
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7356581