Evolutionarily stable in-group altruism in intergroup conflict over (local) public goods
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Evolutionarily stable in-group altruism in intergroup conflict over (local) public goods
zbMATH Open document ID: 1466.91029
author: Guillaume Cheikbossian
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2021-06-08T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
zbMATH DE Number: 7356587
zbMATH Keywords: indirect evolutionary approach
zbMATH Keywords: evolutionary stability
zbMATH Keywords: altruism
zbMATH Keywords: group contest
zbMATH Keywords: public goods
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2021.03.003
OpenAlex ID: W3147520375
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2021.03.003
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7356587