Level-k reasoning in school choice
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Level-k reasoning in school choice
zbMATH Open document ID: 1466.91212
author: Jun Zhang
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2021-06-08T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
zbMATH DE Number: 7356594
zbMATH Keywords: school choice
zbMATH Keywords: Boston mechanism
zbMATH Keywords: deferred acceptance
zbMATH Keywords: heterogeneous sophistication
zbMATH Keywords: level-k model
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2021.03.007
OpenAlex ID: W3155754332
cites work: Beliefs and endogenous cognitive levels: an experimental study
cites work: Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof
cites work: Cognitive ability and games of school choice
cites work: A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
cites work: School choice: an experimental study
cites work: Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
cites work: Constrained school choice
cites work: Contracts are not salaries in the hidden-substitutes domain
cites work: Credulity, lies, and costly talk
cites work: Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: evidence from the residency match
cites work: Q3251780
cites work: On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
cites work: Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
cites work: OBVIOUSLY STRATEGY‐PROOF IMPLEMENTATION OF TOP TRADING CYCLES
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2021.03.007
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7356594