Limited liability and non-responsiveness in agency models
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Limited liability and non-responsiveness in agency models
zbMATH Open document ID: 1466.91158
author: Henrique Castro-Pires
author: Humberto Moreira
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2021-06-08T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B41
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B43
zbMATH DE Number: 7356598
zbMATH Keywords: limited liability
zbMATH Keywords: adverse selection
zbMATH Keywords: moral hazard
zbMATH Keywords: pooling contracts
zbMATH Keywords: non-responsiveness
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2021.03.010
OpenAlex ID: W3157877664
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2021.03.010
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7356598