Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium
zbMATH Open document ID: 1466.91211
author: Akira Okada
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2021-06-08T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
zbMATH DE Number: 7356603
zbMATH Keywords: decentralized market
zbMATH Keywords: many-to-one matching
zbMATH Keywords: protocol-free equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: sequential bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: stability
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2021.04.006
OpenAlex ID: W3158242103
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2021.04.006
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7356603