On envy-free revenue approximation for combinatorial buyers with budgets
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On envy-free revenue approximation for combinatorial buyers with budgets
zbMATH Open document ID: 1466.91121
author: Evangelos Markakis
author: Apostolos Ntokos
author: Orestis A. Telelis
published in: Theory of Computing Systems
publication date: 2021-06-11T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B24
zbMATH DE Number: 7357728
zbMATH Keywords: revenue maximization
zbMATH Keywords: envy-free outcome
zbMATH Keywords: budget
zbMATH Keywords: valuation function
zbMATH Keywords: approximation
zbMATH Keywords: single-minded
zbMATH Keywords: additive
zbMATH Keywords: subadditive
zbMATH Keywords: submodular
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00224-020-09984-7
OpenAlex ID: W3034890902
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DOI: 10.1007/S00224-020-09984-7
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7357728