Preference aggregation and atoms in measures
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Preference aggregation and atoms in measures
zbMATH Open document ID: 1466.91107
author: Susumu Cato
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 2021-06-23T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B08
zbMATH DE Number: 7362216
zbMATH Keywords: social choice
zbMATH Keywords: Arrow's impossibility theorem
zbMATH Keywords: atoms
zbMATH Keywords: ultrafilter
zbMATH Keywords: non-dictatorship
zbMATH Keywords: finitely additive measure
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jmateco.2020.11.002
OpenAlex ID: W3109339351
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.11.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7362216