Coalitional efficient profit-sharing
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Coalitional efficient profit-sharing
zbMATH Open document ID: 1467.91062
author: Ruben Juarez
author: Kohei Nitta
author: Miguel Vargas
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2021-06-30T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B03
zbMATH DE Number: 7365167
zbMATH Keywords: strong Nash implementation
zbMATH Keywords: profit-sharing
zbMATH Keywords: efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: non-bossy
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.econlet.2021.109875
OpenAlex ID: W3159144853
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DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2021.109875
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7365167