Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains
zbMATH Open document ID: 1468.91066
author: Shinji Ohseto
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 2021-07-15T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
zbMATH DE Number: 7371896
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: Pareto efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: restricted domain
zbMATH Keywords: indivisible good
zbMATH Keywords: monetary transfer
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00182-021-00754-4
OpenAlex ID: W3121212546
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DOI: 10.1007/S00182-021-00754-4
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7371896