Breaking ties in collective decision-making
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Breaking ties in collective decision-making
author: Daniela Bubboloni
author: Michele Gori
published in: Decisions in Economics and Finance
publication date: 2021-08-10T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.10165
review text: In this paper, authors found out conditions which make a social preference (multiwinner social choice) correspondence admit a resolute refinement fulfilling some weak versions of the anonymity and neutrality principles. Authors also obtained when it is possible to obtain, for those resolute refinements, the reversal symmetry (immunity to the reversal bias).
reviewed by: Santanu Acharjee
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 7380465
zbMATH Keywords: social preference correspondence
zbMATH Keywords: multiwinner social choice correspondence
zbMATH Keywords: resoluteness
zbMATH Keywords: anonymity
zbMATH Keywords: neutrality
zbMATH Keywords: tie-breaking rule
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3080131284
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DOI: 10.1007/S10203-020-00294-8
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7380465