The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting
The authors consider a game-theoretic model of voting, where the voters have to bear some cost when they decide to cast a vote, and one of the two candidates (alternatives) is handicapped in the sense that a handicapped candidate needs to gather some extra votes to win with an opponent. It turns out that for a large handicap (relatively to the cost of voting) the strategy that the voters abstain from voting is in equilibrium (called the no-show equilibrium), while for a small handicap other strategies can be in equilibrium (either coexisting with the no-show equilibrium, or ruling it out). The extensions of the basic model, like introducing partisan voters (no-cost voters), variable cost among voters' preferences and multiple candidates, are shortly addressed as well. As an application of the presented theory the assessment voting is proposed. It is a two-stage voting, where a potentially small assessment group of randomly chosen voters participates in a pre-voting, next the outcome of this pre-voting is made public and finally the whole population of voters (excluding assessment group) is allowed to add their votes to the pre-voting pool of votes. Under suitable assumptions, the outcome of the assessment voting procedure is in agreement with the outcome of the pre-voting. The article includes a thorough discussion of the existing body of literature; current examples from politics are brought to the reader's attention.
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7380911
scientific article