Games with coupled populations: an experiment in continuous time
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Games with coupled populations: an experiment in continuous time
zbMATH Open document ID: 1470.91067
author: Volker Benndorf
author: Ismael Martínez-Martínez
author: Hans-Theo Normann
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2021-08-11T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
zbMATH DE Number: 7380920
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium selection
zbMATH Keywords: population games
zbMATH Keywords: continuous-time experiment
describes a project that uses: ORSEE
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2021.105281
OpenAlex ID: W3164083116
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Games with coupled populations: an experiment in continuous time (DOI)
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2021.105281