Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values
zbMATH Open document ID: 1470.91028
author: Koji Yokote
author: Takumi Kongo
author: Yukihiko Funaki
published in: Theory and Decision
publication date: 2021-08-17T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 7382551
zbMATH Keywords: redistribution
zbMATH Keywords: TU game
zbMATH Keywords: axiomatization
zbMATH Keywords: egalitarian Shapley value
zbMATH Keywords: consensus value
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s11238-020-09781-1
OpenAlex ID: W3102048744
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DOI: 10.1007/S11238-020-09781-1
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7382551