School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms
zbMATH Open document ID: 1468.91100
author: Paula Jaramillo
author: Flip Klijn
author: Çağatay Kayı
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 2021-09-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
zbMATH DE Number: 7389292
zbMATH Keywords: school choice
zbMATH Keywords: rank-priority mechanisms
zbMATH Keywords: stability
zbMATH Keywords: Nash implementation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jmateco.2021.102496
OpenAlex ID: W3132198061
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JMATECO.2021.102496
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7389292