Social pressure in networks induces public good provision
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Social pressure in networks induces public good provision
zbMATH Open document ID: 1478.91082
author: David Jimenez-Gomez
published in: Games
publication date: 2021-11-26T00:00:00Z
review text: Summary: I develop a dynamic model with forward looking agents, and show that social pressure is effective in generating provision in a public good game: after a small group of agents start contributing to the public good, other agents decide to contribute as well due to a fear of being punished, and this generates contagion in the network. In contrast to earlier models in the literature, contagion happens fast, as part of the best response of fully rational individuals. The network topology has implications for whether contagion starts and the extent to which it spreads. I find conditions under which an agent decides to be the first to contribute in order to generate contagion in the network, as well as conditions for contribution due to a self-fulfilling fear of social pressure.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
zbMATH DE Number: 7434003
zbMATH Keywords: social pressure
zbMATH Keywords: public goods
zbMATH Keywords: contagion
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: g12010004
OpenAlex ID: W3119664054
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DOI: 10.3390/G12010004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7434003