Intention or request: the impact of message structures
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Intention or request: the impact of message structures
zbMATH Open document ID: 1478.91030
author: Siyu Wang
author: Timothy Flannery
published in: Games
publication date: 2021-11-26T00:00:00Z
review text: Summary: This paper investigates how different message structures impact communication strategy as well as sender and receiver behavior. Specifically, we focus on comparing communication games with messages stating an intention versus a request. Our experimental results show that when a game includes self-signaling or self-committing messages, the two message structures yield negligibly different results. However, when the messages of the game are neither self-signaling nor self-committing, we find that more subjects send messages suggesting cooperation with request than intention. Interestingly, subjects also deviate from their suggested actions more frequently with request than intention. We surmise lying aversion plays a prominent role in contributing to the differences in games where messages lack the self-committing property.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
zbMATH DE Number: 7434011
zbMATH Keywords: communication
zbMATH Keywords: cheap talk
zbMATH Keywords: experiment
zbMATH Keywords: lying aversion
describes a project that uses: oTree
describes a project that uses: ORSEE
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: g12010012
OpenAlex ID: W3129128760
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DOI: 10.3390/G12010012
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7434011