A generalization of quantal response equilibrium via perturbed utility
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A generalization of quantal response equilibrium via perturbed utility
zbMATH Open document ID: 1478.91031
author: Roy Allen
author: John Rehbeck
published in: Games
publication date: 2021-11-26T00:00:00Z
review text: Summary: We present a tractable generalization of quantal response equilibrium via non-expected utility preferences. In particular, we introduce concave perturbed utility games in which an individual has strategy-specific utility indices that depend on the outcome of the game and an additively separable preference to randomize. The preference to randomize can be viewed as a reduced form of limited attention. Using concave perturbed utility games, we show how to enrich models based on logit best response that are common from quantal response equilibrium. First, the desire to randomize can depend on opponents' strategies. Second, we show how to derive a nested logit best response function. Lastly, we present tractable quadratic perturbed utility games that allow complementarity.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A30
zbMATH DE Number: 7434019
zbMATH Keywords: quantal response equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: non-expected utility
zbMATH Keywords: limited attention
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: g12010020
OpenAlex ID: W3135620714
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DOI: 10.3390/G12010020
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7434019