Private value takeover auctions with toeholds: an experimental study
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Private value takeover auctions with toeholds: an experimental study
zbMATH Open document ID: 1479.91148
author: Anna Dodonova
author: Yuri Khoroshilov
published in: Games
publication date: 2021-11-26T00:00:00Z
review text: Summary: This paper presents the results of an experimental study of takeover auctions with toeholds. Consistent with the theory, we find a positive effect of toeholds on bidding. Such an effect, however, is of a lower magnitude and the bidding premium function has an opposite slope than the theory predicts, which can be attributed both to risk aversion and subjects' tendency to think of their bids in relative terms. Consistent with the theory we find no cross-bidder toehold effect, however, such a result is inconsistent with the observed bidding function if people expect their opponents to behave the same way as they do.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91-05
zbMATH DE Number: 7434039
zbMATH Keywords: auction
zbMATH Keywords: takeover
zbMATH Keywords: toehold
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: g12020040
OpenAlex ID: W3159081779
cites work: A Theory of Costly Sequential Bidding*
cites work: Jump bidding in ascending auctions: the case of takeover contests
cites work: Participation Costs and Inefficiency in Takeover Contests
cites work: Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
DOI: 10.3390/G12020040
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7434039