Optimal contract under double moral hazard and limited liability
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Optimal contract under double moral hazard and limited liability
zbMATH Open document ID: 1479.91175
author: Jiajia Cong
author: Wen Zhou
published in: Journal of Economics
publication date: 2021-12-09T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B41
zbMATH DE Number: 7441625
zbMATH Keywords: double moral hazard
zbMATH Keywords: limited liability
zbMATH Keywords: optimal contract
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00712-021-00737-9
OpenAlex ID: W3148968433
cites work: Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
cites work: Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
cites work: Moral hazard with bounded payments
cites work: Minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems
cites work: Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard
cites work: The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
DOI: 10.1007/S00712-021-00737-9
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7441625