Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects
zbMATH Open document ID: 1479.91157
author: Bettina Klaus
author: Alexandru Nichifor
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2021-12-10T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
zbMATH DE Number: 7442210
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00355-020-01303-w
OpenAlex ID: W3130134335
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-020-01303-W
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7442210