Dominance in spatial voting with imprecise ideals
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Dominance in spatial voting with imprecise ideals
zbMATH Open document ID: 1479.91114
author: Mathieu Martin
author: Zéphirin Nganmeni
author: Craig A. Tovey
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2021-12-10T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 7442212
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00355-021-01316-z
OpenAlex ID: W3133599634
cites work: Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model
cites work: Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model
cites work: Q3857361
cites work: Comparison of Weighting Judgments in Multiattribute Utility Measurement
cites work: Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule
cites work: Limiting distributions for continuous state Markov voting models
cites work: Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule
cites work: Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
cites work: A dynamical model of political equilibrium
cites work: On the uniqueness of the yolk
cites work: Approximation of the yolk by the LP yolk
cites work: The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
cites work: Stable outcomes in spatial voting games
cites work: Q4235027
cites work: A Note about the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule
cites work: Unifying voting theory from Nakamura's to Greenberg's theorems
cites work: Generic Instability of Majority Rule
cites work: Probability and convergence for supra-majority rule with Euclidean preferences
cites work: Approximate cores of replica games and economies. II: Set-up costs and firm formation in coalition production economies
cites work: Multiple Objective Linear Programming with Interval Criterion Weights
cites work: The instability of instability of centered distributions
cites work: The probability of majority rule instability in the 2D Euclidean model with an even number of voters
DOI: 10.1007/S00355-021-01316-Z
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7442212