Auction mechanisms for allocating subsidies for carbon emissions reduction: an experimental investigation
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Auction mechanisms for allocating subsidies for carbon emissions reduction: an experimental investigation
zbMATH Open document ID: 1479.91152
author: Haoran He
author: Yefeng Chen
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2021-12-10T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B76
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91-05
zbMATH DE Number: 7442219
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00355-021-01318-x
OpenAlex ID: W3137124359
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-021-01318-X
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7442219