Generalized majority rules: utilitarian welfare in large but finite populations
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Generalized majority rules: utilitarian welfare in large but finite populations
zbMATH Open document ID: 1476.91054
author: Marco Faravelli
author: Priscilla T. Y. Man
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2021-12-13T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
zbMATH DE Number: 7443673
zbMATH Keywords: supermajority
zbMATH Keywords: qualified majority
zbMATH Keywords: costly voting
zbMATH Keywords: voter turnout
zbMATH Keywords: compulsory voting
zbMATH Keywords: Poisson game
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-020-01285-x
OpenAlex ID: W3034808808
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-020-01285-X
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7443673