Iterated dominance revisited
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Iterated dominance revisited
zbMATH Open document ID: 1479.91054
author: Amanda Friedenberg
author: H. Jerome Keisler
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2021-12-13T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
zbMATH DE Number: 7443683
zbMATH Keywords: iterated dominance
zbMATH Keywords: rationalizability
zbMATH Keywords: rationality and common belief of rationality
zbMATH Keywords: type structures
zbMATH Keywords: epistemic game theory
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-020-01275-z
OpenAlex ID: W3082024010
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-020-01275-Z
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7443683