Reputation effects in stochastic games with two long-lived players
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Reputation effects in stochastic games with two long-lived players
zbMATH Open document ID: 1479.91031
author: Chantal Marlats
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2021-12-13T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A15
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 7443422
zbMATH Keywords: reputation
zbMATH Keywords: stochastic games
zbMATH Keywords: irreversibility
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-020-01252-6
OpenAlex ID: W3009070239
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-020-01252-6
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7443422