Why mandate young borrowers to contribute to their retirement accounts?
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Why mandate young borrowers to contribute to their retirement accounts?
zbMATH Open document ID: 1479.91302
author: Torben M. Andersen
author: Joydeep Bhattacharya
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2021-12-13T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91G05
zbMATH DE Number: 7443425
zbMATH Keywords: mandated pensions
zbMATH Keywords: time inconsistency
zbMATH Keywords: social security
zbMATH Keywords: dynamic efficiency
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2587544920
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-019-01235-2
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7443425