Evolutionary stability in the generalized second-price auction
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Evolutionary stability in the generalized second-price auction
zbMATH Open document ID: 1479.91154
author: Thomas W. L. Norman
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2021-12-13T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90B60
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
zbMATH DE Number: 7443429
zbMATH Keywords: online advertising
zbMATH Keywords: Internet auctions
zbMATH Keywords: position auctions
zbMATH Keywords: evolutionarily stable strategy
zbMATH Keywords: locally envy-free equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: symmetric Nash equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: Vickrey-Clarke-Groves outcome
zbMATH Keywords: spite
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-019-01240-5
OpenAlex ID: W2992173276
Wikidata QID: Q126620126
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-019-01240-5
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7443429