Peter J. Hammond
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Peter J. Hammond
zbMATH Open document ID: 1482.01025
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-62769-0_12
author: Philippe Mongin
publication date: 2022-01-05T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 01A70
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B15
zbMATH DE Number: 7452138
zbMATH Keywords: interview
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 978-3-030-62769-0 12
OpenAlex ID: W3150573741
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