Equivalence and revenue comparison among identical-item auctions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Equivalence and revenue comparison among identical-item auctions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1480.91114
author: Shuang Xu
author: Yong Zhao
author: Yeming (Yale) Gong
published in: Journal of Economics
publication date: 2022-01-14T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 7457557
zbMATH Keywords: sequential auctions
zbMATH Keywords: information disclosure
zbMATH Keywords: single-unit demand
zbMATH Keywords: multi-unit demand
zbMATH Keywords: expected revenue
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00712-021-00746-8
OpenAlex ID: W3171943870
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DOI: 10.1007/S00712-021-00746-8
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7457557