Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab
zbMATH Open document ID: 1481.91123
author: Robert G. Hammond
author: Onur Kesten
author: Umut Mert Dur
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2022-01-18T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
zbMATH DE Number: 7458499
zbMATH Keywords: school choice
zbMATH Keywords: school assignment
zbMATH Keywords: matching theory
zbMATH Keywords: sequential-move games
describes a project that uses: Z-Tree
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2021.105344
OpenAlex ID: W3202190651
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2021.105344
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7458499