When voters like to be right : an analysis of the Condorcet jury theorem with mixed motives
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: When voters like to be right : an analysis of the Condorcet jury theorem with mixed motives
zbMATH Open document ID: 1481.91072
author: Rune Midjord
author: Tomas Rodriguez-Barraquer
author: Justin Valasek
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2022-01-18T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 7458503
zbMATH Keywords: information aggregation
zbMATH Keywords: voting
zbMATH Keywords: expressive payoffs
zbMATH Keywords: Condorcet jury theorem
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2021.105354
OpenAlex ID: W3200501838
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2021.105354
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7458503