Robust bidding and revenue in descending price auctions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Robust bidding and revenue in descending price auctions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1481.91084
author: Sarah Auster
author: Christian Kellner
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2022-01-18T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: revision.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 7458523
zbMATH Keywords: auctions
zbMATH Keywords: ambiguity
zbMATH Keywords: consistent planning
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3002379378
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2020.105072
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7458523