Voting power on a graph connected political space with an application to decision-making in the council of the European Union
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Voting power on a graph connected political space with an application to decision-making in the council of the European Union
zbMATH Open document ID: 1481.91070
author: Stefano Benati
author: Giuseppe Vittucci Marzetti
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2022-01-20T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91F10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A68
zbMATH DE Number: 7460349
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00355-021-01339-6
OpenAlex ID: W3159606244
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-021-01339-6
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7460349