Privacy, patience, and protection
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Privacy, patience, and protection
zbMATH Open document ID: 1481.91036
author: Ronen Gradwohl
author: Rann Smorodinsky
published in: Dynamic Games and Applications
publication date: 2022-01-20T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 7460366
zbMATH Keywords: privacy
zbMATH Keywords: privacy protection
zbMATH Keywords: perception games
zbMATH Keywords: signaling games
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s13235-021-00386-z
OpenAlex ID: W3157978979
cites work: Myopic perception in repeated games
cites work: Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
cites work: Dynamic psychological games
cites work: On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
cites work: Privacy Games
cites work: Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
cites work: Differential Privacy: A Survey of Results
cites work: Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2004
cites work: Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players
cites work: Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information
cites work: Psychological games and sequential rationality
cites work: Selling privacy at auction
cites work: Information dependent games: can common sense be common knowledge?
cites work: A Further Generalization of the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem, with Application to Nash Equilibrium Points
cites work: Perception games and privacy
cites work: Signaling and tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
cites work: Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons
cites work: Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
cites work: Transparency and price formation
cites work: Cooperation under incomplete information on the discount factors
cites work: Game Theory
cites work: Q3549600
cites work: Approximately optimal mechanism design via differential privacy
cites work: Q3576736
cites work: Monopolistic signal provision
cites work: Q5297301
cites work: Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
DOI: 10.1007/S13235-021-00386-Z
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7460366