Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form
zbMATH Open document ID: 1482.91010
author: Stéphane Gonzalez
author: Aymeric Lardon
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2022-01-24T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 7462332
zbMATH Keywords: effectiveness function
zbMATH Keywords: core
zbMATH Keywords: axiomatization
zbMATH Keywords: holdover property
zbMATH Keywords: consistency principle
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.mathsocsci.2021.09.001
OpenAlex ID: W3201607707
cites work: On necessary and sufficient conditions for solvability of game forms.
cites work: Q3254691
cites work: Rational Selection of Decision Functions
cites work: Farsighted coalitional stability
cites work: Aggregation of multiple prior opinions
cites work: The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments
cites work: Stable networks
cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
cites work: Q3378952
cites work: POSITIVELY RESPONSIVE COLLECTIVE CHOICE RULES AND MAJORITY RULE: A GENERALIZATION OF MAY'S THEOREM TO MANY ALTERNATIVES
cites work: Strongly stable networks
cites work: A strategic model of social and economic networks
cites work: Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities
cites work: Consistency and its converse for roommate markets
cites work: Axioms for Deferred Acceptance
cites work: Implementation via rights structures
cites work: Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?
cites work: Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
cites work: Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
cites work: The Bargaining Problem
cites work: Equilibrium points in n -person games
cites work: Characterization of the core in full domain marriage problems
cites work: Equilibrium selection and consistency
cites work: An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments
cites work: On the reduced game property and its converse
cites work: An Axiomatization of the Core of Market Games
cites work: Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions
cites work: Minimality of consistent solutions for strategic games, in particular for potential games
cites work: An axiomatization of Nash equilibria in economic situations
cites work: The consistency principle for games in strategic form
cites work: Consistency, dummy and independence of irrelevant strategies for strategic games
cites work: Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
cites work: Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems
cites work: Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions
cites work: Internal Consistency of Choice
cites work: On cores and indivisibility
cites work: Q4119058
cites work: Q5202533
cites work: Consistency and its converse: an introduction
cites work: On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals
cites work: Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games
cites work: A new axiomatization of the core of games with transferable utility
DOI: 10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2021.09.001
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7462332