Entry regulations and optimal prize allocation in parallel contests
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Entry regulations and optimal prize allocation in parallel contests
zbMATH Open document ID: 1482.91058
author: Martin Grossmann
published in: Review of Economic Design
publication date: 2022-01-24T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B03
zbMATH DE Number: 7462467
zbMATH Keywords: parallel contests
zbMATH Keywords: entry
zbMATH Keywords: aggregate taking behavior
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s10058-021-00250-x
OpenAlex ID: W3161101701
cites work: The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior
cites work: Rent seeking and entry
cites work: Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
cites work: The theory of contests: a survey
cites work: Competing for talents
cites work: Tournaments with Prize-setting Agents*
cites work: Racing with Uncertainty
cites work: Aggregative games and best-reply potentials
cites work: Q5323812
cites work: Multi-battle contests
cites work: Contests with a stochastic number of players
cites work: Contest architecture
cites work: Endogenous entry in contests
cites work: Population uncertainty in contests
cites work: Comparative Statics of Contests and Rent-Seeking Games
cites work: The Colonel Blotto game
cites work: The non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game
cites work: Election Goals and the Allocation of Campaign Resources
DOI: 10.1007/S10058-021-00250-X
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7462467