Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2022-02-04T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 00Bxx
zbMATH DE Number: 7469123
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-021-01383-4
OpenAlex ID: W3193705384
cites work: Ambiguous persuasion
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-021-01383-4
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7469123