Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade?
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade?
zbMATH Open document ID: 1482.91038
author: Jacopo Bizzotto
author: Adrien Vigier
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2022-02-04T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A25
zbMATH DE Number: 7469124
zbMATH Keywords: Bayesian persuasion
zbMATH Keywords: dynamic games
zbMATH Keywords: information provision
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-020-01321-w
OpenAlex ID: W3094478661
cites work: Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
cites work: Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
cites work: Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
cites work: Competition in Persuasion
cites work: When to Drop a Bombshell
cites work: Dynamic persuasion
cites work: Experimental design to persuade
cites work: Q5783814
DOI: 10.1007/S00199-020-01321-W
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7469124