Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment
zbMATH Open document ID: 1482.91042
author: Daehong Min
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2022-02-04T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A27
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 7469126
zbMATH Keywords: communication
zbMATH Keywords: Bayesian persuasion
zbMATH Keywords: cheap talk
zbMATH Keywords: imperfect commitment
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-021-01386-1
OpenAlex ID: W3198303905
cites work: Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-021-01386-1
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7469126