Competitive disclosure of correlated information
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Competitive disclosure of correlated information
zbMATH Open document ID: 1482.91037
author: Pak Hung Au
author: Keiichi Kawai
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2022-02-04T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A27
zbMATH DE Number: 7469128
zbMATH Keywords: Bayesian persuasion
zbMATH Keywords: multiple senders
zbMATH Keywords: correlated information
zbMATH Keywords: disclosure
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-018-01171-7
OpenAlex ID: W2946629642
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Wikidata QID: Q128625894
DOI: 10.1007/S00199-018-01171-7
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7469128