Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences
zbMATH Open document ID: 1482.91061
author: Zhi-Wei Liu
author: Nicholas C. Yannelis
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2022-02-04T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B03
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B08
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 7469129
zbMATH Keywords: persuasion
zbMATH Keywords: efficient
zbMATH Keywords: individually rational
zbMATH Keywords: incentive compatibility
zbMATH Keywords: Wald's maxmin preferences
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-021-01364-7
OpenAlex ID: W3157877373
cites work: Value allocation under ambiguity
cites work: Ambiguous persuasion
cites work: Robust mechanisms: the curvature case
cites work: Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
cites work: Core and equilibria under ambiguity
cites work: Implementation under ambiguity
cites work: Ambiguous implementation: the partition model
cites work: A new approach to the rational expectations equilibrium: existence, optimality and incentive compatibility
cites work: Purification and disambiguation of Ellsberg equilibria
cites work: Persuasion with costly precision
cites work: Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
cites work: An extensive form interpretation of the private core
cites work: Incentive compatibility under ambiguity
cites work: Equilibrium theory under ambiguity
cites work: Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
cites work: Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver
cites work: Randomization and Ambiguity Aversion
cites work: On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities
cites work: Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium
cites work: Randomization under ambiguity: efficiency and incentive compatibility
cites work: Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
cites work: Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity
cites work: Weak implementation
cites work: On the equivalence of rational expectations equilibrium with perfect Bayesian equilibrium
DOI: 10.1007/S00199-021-01364-7
Recommended article: Asymmetric information and rationalizability
Recommended article: On the Welfare Analysis of Rational Expectations Equilibria with Asymmetric Information
Recommended article: Perfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives
Recommended article: Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies
Recommended article: On Competitive Equilibria with Asymmetric Information
Recommended article: Comparing allocations under asymmetric information: Coase theorem revisited
Recommended article: Q4467796
Recommended article: Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: the core
Recommended article: Q5316198
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7469129