Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms
zbMATH Open document ID: 1482.91041
author: Yanyan Li
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2022-02-04T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A27
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 60E15
zbMATH DE Number: 7469133
zbMATH Keywords: Bayesian persuasion
zbMATH Keywords: stochastic orders
zbMATH Keywords: majorization
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-020-01277-x
OpenAlex ID: W3035335331
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-020-01277-X
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7469133