Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles
zbMATH Open document ID: 1482.91057
author: John A. Weymark
author: Paul Edelman
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2022-02-04T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B03
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
zbMATH DE Number: 7469136
zbMATH Keywords: dominant strategy incentive compatibility
zbMATH Keywords: implementation theory
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: revenue equivalence
zbMATH Keywords: Rochet's theorem
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-020-01324-7
OpenAlex ID: W3124122677
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-020-01324-7
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7469136