Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
zbMATH Open document ID: 1483.91055
author: Dolors Berga
author: Bernardo Moreno
author: Salvador Barberà
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2022-02-25T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 1024 0.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B03
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B08
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 7481314
zbMATH Keywords: mechanisms
zbMATH Keywords: interdependent types
zbMATH Keywords: ex post incentive compatibility
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: Pareto efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: preference functions
zbMATH Keywords: jury decisions
zbMATH Keywords: allocation problems
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3214430762
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2021.10.008
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7481314