Limited foresight equilibrium
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Limited foresight equilibrium
zbMATH Open document ID: 1483.91020
author: Jeevant Rampal
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2022-02-25T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A11
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A18
zbMATH DE Number: 7481338
zbMATH Keywords: foresight
zbMATH Keywords: sequential equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: sequential bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: centipede game
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2022.01.001
OpenAlex ID: W4205933424
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2022.01.001
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7481338